Argthtjtr

(Correct me if I am wrong)In ontology, essentialism is the belief that

object O has property P,property P is therefore an **ESSENTIAL** property







if there is something else which is not property P it is an **ACCIDENTAL**

property

So what are the contemporary views on "essential" human properties?

Introductory remarks

This is subject to debate and there is no definite answer. The general consensus is that no definite set of properties can possibly be given and if it is done, these sets are relative to the end they serve and the historical as well as the cultural context, i.e. we live in a "post-essentialist world" (Ramsey 2013). I can and will give you an oversight of positions regarding the subject matter and point you towards relevant sources found at the end of the answer.

(These textbits have been part of my MA dissertation and are mostly a direct copy of my own intellectual property)

Essentialism is contested by the Darwinian Challenge

The often discussed locus classicus of the Darwinian Challenge is the paper On Human Nature (Hull 1986) by David L. Hull. He argues for complete omission of any scientific account of human nature defined by traits or properties of a species and simply going by genealogical understanding of species, i.e. by family relations (Ramsey 2013; Kronfeldner, Roughley & Toepfer 2014). The summary of Hull’s argument given by Ramsey (Ramsey 2013) suggests a twofold argument: On one hand, biological species are as a matter of fact defined by “evolving lineages” (Hull 1986:10) in the science of biology, i.e. by family relations, and not by traits or properties exhibited. On the other hand, there is no set of traits exhibited by every member of a species at a given time or throughout history that can be considered as unique to that species. That both sides of the argument reinforce each other cannot be understood from Ramsey’s summary alone, but only by adding a crucial third argument of Hull’s: both genetical and phenotypical variability are indeed essential (sic!) and necessary features of complex biological species since they are necessary for their evolutionary success. This, Hull argues, is particularly true for the species homo sapiens (ibid:10–11). Thus, biological kinds are fundamentally different from the natural kinds as they show a great variety in their instantiations.

The addition of Hull’s third argument would suggest that it is in the very nature of our species to show a great variety of traits. Consequently, there is no single set of traits able to define the species, in turn resulting in family relations being the only viable option for defining this species.

Applying this argument to the relation between human nature as a set of traits and the human species, every possible definite set of traits used for defining the species leaves us with a dilemma: Either it is so restrictive that we exclude some important traits that are commonly exhibited by members of the human species or individuals that are in fact part of the biological species (i.e. direct relatives of humans) simply because they lack at least one trait used to define "essential" human nature. Or it is so lenient that individuals of other biological species would have to be considered "human", i.e. it lacks distinctiveness. As if this would not be bad enough, one has to conclude that even if, against all odds, such a set of traits would be found, it would be a mere historical contingency. Or as Edouard Machery puts it:

To focus on humans, it is hard to find any property that is both distinctive of humans and common to all humans. Furthermore, even if a property were both distinctive and universal, this state of affairs would be contingent. It would not be a necessary property for being a human. (Machery 2008:325)

As we will see in the upcoming discussion of the Darwinian Challenge, those criticisms as well as most answers have two things in common:

Firstly, the argument is broadly successful as they tend to acknowledge that the implications of a scientific understanding of evolution and essentialist notions so understood are antithetic to one another.

Secondly, the answers to this “Darwinian challenge” to human nature revolve around traits or characteristics that can be grasped through the methods of the empirical or natural sciences as well, i.e. do not leave the boundaries of the discourse as a scientific one. In other words, they try to dispel a biological argument while remaining in a biological framework.

Possible answers to the Darwinian Challenge

An extensive overview of the possible reactions to the Darwinian Challenge is given by Kronfeldner et. al. (Kronfeldner, Roughley & Toepfer 2014). If the Darwinian Challenge is to be dealt with constructively, neither rejecting the scientific insights and evidence put forward and returning to classic essentialism, nor simply accepting pluralism are viable options. This leaves us with four different approaches as per Kronfeldner et. al.:

The constructive positions held in the recent literature attribute different epistemic roles to the concept of human nature: descriptive (descriptivism), explanatory (explanativism), taxonomic (taxonomic relationalism), or a new combination of explanatory and definitional roles (property cluster essentialism). (ibid:645)

Descriptivism

Descriptivism is acknowledging the argument insofar as it does not argue that any given set of traits serves both aspects of the definition of natural kinds, i.e. can play both a definitional and explanatory role. By omitting any explanatory ambitions, this approach still serves the scientific need of accurate description of how the world is and defining the explanandum, i.e. deliver means to determine the object of scientific inquiry of the human. There are two general ways to do so: Firstly, one may try finding traits that are generally exhibited by members of the class described. This is constituting a conceptual grasp that does not even attempt to be a description of a “nature” that allows for taxonomical use because they are not unique to the species (e.g. Machery’s nomological approach). The second way specifically uses trait clusters instead of one single set of traits. This allows for more accuracy regarding the description of the uniqueness of the human at a given point in time (e.g. Ramsey’s approach of using historical trait clusters). Here, the historicity forbids taxonomical use in the sense of biological species instead of a lack of specificity.

Explanativism

Explanativism takes a similar route as descriptivism but concentrates on the other aspect of the definition of natural kinds, the explanans. Refusing to call any descriptive cluster human nature, explanativism instead starts considerations with them as that which is to be explained by human nature and considers the relations between the clusters that constitute similarities and differences between humans (within humanity) and in contrast to other animals (non-human life-forms). This results in patterns or explanative categories that are not themselves directly observable features of humans. Thus, they cannot be used in a descriptive sense but do allow for or explain the similarities and differences caught by descriptive approaches, i.e. they “provide the deepest explanation of why humans are the way they are” (ibid:647). These approaches can take a variety of guises, but I will focus on those mentioned by Kronfeldner et. al.:

1. The comparative studies of apes against human children by the research group around Michael Tomasello that resulted in his hypothesis of a shared intentionality unique to and typical for humans (Tomasello 2008). This approach explicitly refers to the structure of human communication, but treat it as something relying on and built upon capacities and structures that developed through evolutionary processes that further explain cultural and linguistical diversity (ibid:7–12).




2. Richard Samuels analyses cognitive and behavioural sciences as relying upon and trying to model mechanisms that allow for descriptions and especially predictions of human behaviour, essentially finding explanations that account for both similarities and differences exhibited by causing these similarities and differences. A specific element of his theory missing in the elaboration by Kronfeldner et.al. is his adoption – and defence of the use – of “HPC kinds” (HPC = homeostatic property cluster) developed by Richard Boyd. HPC kinds modify the definition of natural kinds so that they do not require intrinsic properties anymore, among other things, but still can serve both definitional and explanatory deeds (Samuels 2012:21–24).




3. Denis Walsh proposes that those capacities and mechanisms that allow for evolutionary development of a species constitute explanatory essences. As Samuels points out, this is an interpretation of Aristotle’s writings on causation that adopts some views on how the coming to being of a thing is that which makes it the way it is (ibid:20). Walsh indeed turns his argument not on human nature, but is more trying to argue that a certain Aristotelian understanding of essence is “indispensable to evolutionary biology” in general (Walsh 2006:425): those explanatory essences are necessary capacities and mechanisms that explain how evolution is possible.




4. The theory of Kim Sterelny identifies two different feedback loops that are both unique and typical to humans and explain their behavioural variety and evolutionary potential. Therefore, it can be seen as an approach similar to Walsh’s in describing explanatory essences that focus on explaining the particular evolutionary becoming. On the other hand, Sterelny is focusing a lot on learning and social behaviour and tries to explain the unique human abilities in this field as having developed through evolution, hence he is probably closer to Tomasello in both function and focus of his concept of positive feedback loops.

Taxonomic Relationalism

Taxonomic Relationalism focuses on how the boundaries between species are drawn within science: on one hand, the method of using genealogical relations is declared as the primary means to distinguish biological species and families, on the other hand, this primary method is complemented by descriptive means for determining a particular species as object of inquiry where they are not in conflict. In that view, intrinsic properties can never define individuals as members of a biological species as they result from relational properties as only possible basis of any scientific taxonomy. In this sense, relational properties are explanatory for intrinsic properties. More specifically, Samir Okasha describes essential properties as being relational rather than intrinsic ones and thereby dodges the anti-essentialist criticism of Mayr, but also Kripke, Putnam, and Wiggins (Okasha 2002). By that, he goes beyond and in some ways against Hull, who suggests a similar approach.

Property Cluster Essentialism

Property Cluster Essentialism is mainly built on the HPCs developed by Richard Boyd. While Kronfeldner et. al. claim that Boyd mainly modifies the notion of essences so that they do not have to be necessary, sufficient, and intrinsic (Kronfeldner, Roughley & Toepfer 2014:648), Boyd himself argues for the necessity of modifying the understanding of natural kinds to accommodate biological species, namely by dropping lawfulness, exactness, necessity and sufficiency, and ahistoricity/eternality (Boyd 1999:151–57). It is also interesting that Kronfeldner et. al. categorise Samuels under explanatory approaches while he himself argues for using HPCs because they can serve both explanatory and definitional needs. The reason probably lies in Samuels’ labelling of HPCs as causal essences, i.e. the assigned primary role they are meant to play in his argument. As Samuels points out, there is no way HPCs can play the taxonomic role of classical essences, while Boyd argues for their principle viability.

Conclusion

The discussion ends with the same conclusion as the one drawn by Kronfeldner et. al.: there obviously are both possibility and need for concepts of human nature that can dodge or adapt to the Darwinian Challenge. The three main concerns are:

1. That despite the great number of different theoretical considerations and arguments for such a possibility, there are few – if any – takes that are worked out to a level that makes them directly applicable, especially regarding a direct link to empirical findings.




2. The approaches to render human nature will have to be accommodated to the particular needs of the respective application – which will differ between sciences and sometimes even within a single science, thus constituting a plurality of “human natures” without any means to rank them as more or less appropriate.




3. When considering human nature, the normative implications are seldom of interest for scientific authors, although they are of obvious practical importance when applying the concept.

Relevant Sources

Albers, Marion, Hoffmann, Thomas & Reinhardt, Jörn (eds.) (2014): Human rights and human nature. Dordrecht: Springer.

Boyd, Richard (1989): 'What realism implies and what it does not', Dialectica 43:1‐2, pp. 5–29.

Boyd, Richard (1991): 'Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds', Philosophical studies 61, pp. 127–148.

Boyd, Richard (1999): 'Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa', in: R. A. Wilson (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 141–186.

Ereshefsky, Mark (2009): 'Natural kinds in biology', in: E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Routledge.

Ghiselin, Michael T. (1997): Metaphysics and the origin of species. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press.

Hull, David L. (1986): 'On Human Nature', PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:2, pp. 3–13.

Kronfeldner, Maria, Roughley, Neil & Toepfer, Georg (2014): 'Recent Work on Human Nature: Beyond Traditional Essences', Philosophy Compass 9:9, pp. 642–652.

Machery, Edouard (2008): 'A Plea for Human Nature', Philosophical Psychology 21:3, pp. 321–329.

Okasha, Samir (2002): 'Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism', Synthese 131:2, pp. 191–213.

Ramsey, Grant (2013): 'Human Nature in a Post-essentialist World', Philosophy of Science 80:5, pp. 983–993.

Roughley, Neil (ed.) (2000): Being Humans: Anthropological Universality and Particularity in Transdisciplinary Perspectives. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Samuels, Richard (2012): 'Science and Human Nature', Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70, pp. 1–28.

Sterelny, Kim (2012): The evolved apprentice: How evolution made humans unique. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Tomasello, Michael, et al. (2005): 'In Search of the Uniquely Human', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28:05.

Tomasello, Michael (2008): Origins of human communication. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Walsh, Denis (2006): 'Evolutionary Essentialism', The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57:2, pp. 425–448.

Maria Kronfeldner rejects the possibility of an essentialist definition of human nature because biological evolution is a complex, dynamic and fluid process which produces populations rather than individuals, stable only in a specific time and place:

given Darwinian ontology, there are no necessary and sufficient
conditions for membership in a biological species (fulfilling the
classificatory role of an essence) that are at the same time (as
required from an essence) fulfilling an explanatory role for the
traits that are characteristic of the kind.

If you can find her book, I do believe she reviews lists of defining human traits that have been proposed by essentialists in the past. Something as simple as spoken language might work at the descriptive level for human populations, but it doesn't really explain what a human is in a universal way (a mute person is still human).